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Abstract
We set up a model for reasoning about met-
ric spaces with belief theoretic measures. The
uncertainty in these spaces stems from both
probability and metric structures. To rep-
resent both aspect of uncertainty, we choose
an expected distance function as a measure
of uncertainty. A formal logical system is
constructed for the reasoning about expected
distance. Soundness and completeness are
shown for this logic. For reasoning on prod-
uct metric spaces with uncertainty, a new
metric is defined and shown to have good
properties.
1 Introduction
For formal representation of uncertainty with proba-
bilistic or belief theoretic measures, there exists a wide
spectrum of models with complete logical systems (eg.
see Halpern 2003, Nilsson 1986, Bacchus 1990, Gerla
1994). There also exists a wide variety of formal sys-
tems on spatial reasoning (eg. see Gabelaia et al. 2005,
Asher & Vieu 1995, Lemon & Pratt 1998) and espe-
cially on reasoning about metric spaces (eg. see Kutz
et al. 2003, Wolter & Zakharyaschev 2005). But it is
hard to find a formal system when probabilistic uncer-
tainty is present on metric spaces.
In probabilistic or statistical analysis, it is usually as-
sumed that values of random variables are real num-
bers. Since most of statistical inference is related to
reasoning about expectation and variance, restricting
the range of random variables to the spaces where
those values are well defined is considered as an accept-
able sacrifice. A formal reasoning system on expecta-
tions with respect to probability measures and other
belief theoretic measures can be found in (Halpern &
Pucella 2002).
Even though expectations of an event cannot be de-
fined on arbitrary metric spaces, the expectation of
distances with respect to a fixed set is well defined in
any metric space. For example, an expectation of a
random location on a sphere cannot be defined, but
an expected distance of a random location from the
south hemisphere is a well defined notion. The ex-
pected distance is often interpreted as a loss function
in statistical decision theory (Berger 1985).
Loss(a) = EP (d(X, a)).
In this case, the distance function d(x, a) with re-
spected to a fixed point a is used to calculate the cost
for predicting x when a is a true state. A complimen-
tary concept of a cost function in decision theory is
a utility function. The expected utility function has
been an important topic in economics for a long time
(Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944; Savage 1954;
Schmeidler 1989). We can also find more general-
ized expected utility functions defined for plausibility
measures and generalized utility functions. (Chu &
Halpern 2003; 2004).
The objective of a decision problem is to find an action
that minimizes a loss function. For example, if we have
a uniform prior probability distribution on [0, 1] where
d(x, y) = |x− y|, the loss minimizing prediction would
beX = 0.5. But in inference problems, the objective is
to derive more information from given information. As
an example, for the previous distance function, if we
know that EP (d(X, 0)) = 1, then we can deduce that
EP (d(X, 1)) = 0. For inference problems, a viewpoint
from fuzzy logic is also meaningful. Let’s assume that
a fuzzy set Da represents a fuzzy concept “dissimilar
from a” for a point a in a 1-bounded metric space
Ω. A natural candidate for a membership function of
Da would be d(x, a). Given a probability distribution
P , Zadeh (1968) introduces the probability of a fuzzy
concept.
P (Da) =
∫
Ω
µDadP = EP (d(X, a)).
We can interpret this as an expected dissimilarity of
a from Ω − {a}. Even though probability of fuzzy
events is one possible representation of uncertainty in
metric spaces, no formal reasoning system was pro-
vided yet. There has been various attempts to gen-
eralize Shannon’s entropy to the metric spaces using
expected similarity and expected distance (Yager 1992;
Lee 2006).
In this paper, we will generate a formal axiomatic rea-
soning system using expected distance measures and
prove soundness and completeness of the system. Since
the expected distance function turns out to be a doubt
function, we can also define various dual measures. For
reasoning on product spaces, we will introduce a new
product metric and define mutual independence with
respect to expected distance.
2 Expected distance
A probability space is a tuple (Ω,F , P ) where Ω is a
set, F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω and P : F → [0, 1]
is a function satisfying the properties of probability
• Prob1. P (A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ F .
• Prob2. P (Ω) = 1.
• Prob3. P (⋂∞i=1Ai) =∑∞i=1 P (Ai)
if Ai ⊂ F are disjoint.
To exclude problems with measurability, we will fur-
ther assume that F = PΩ. In most of applications Ω
is a finite set and P is defined at every point.
A 1-bounded pseudo metric space is a tuple (Ω, d)
where Ω is a set and d is a function on Ω × Ω that
satisfies
• PMet1. d(x, x) = 0 (reflexive)
• PMet2. d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry)
• PMet3. d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z) (triangular in-
equality)
• PMet4. d(x, y) ≤ 1 (1-bounded)
for all x, y, z ∈ Ω. To become a metric space, d should
satisfy an extra condition
If d(x, y) = 0 then x = y.
In practice, this condition is too strong for a reason-
ing system. Allowing a zero distance between two in-
stances is a common approach in spatial reasoning.
We further assume that the metric in our system is
bounded by 1 because of following reasons. First,
in most applications distance functions are practically
bounded. Even if it is not bounded, there are conven-
tional methods that normalize a metric space (Ω, d)
into a 1 bounded metric space such as (Ω, d1+d ). Espe-
cially if d is bounded byM , (Ω, dM ) is a straightforward
conversion. Second, if metrics are not bounded by a
certain number, it is hard to compare distances from
multiple metrics. To get a normalized degree of un-
certainty, a bound is a necessity. Third, 1 bounded
metrics works well with probability or belief func-
tions that are also 1 bounded. As an example, since
Pr(A) is bounded by 1, for independent events A,B,
we have Pr(A and B) ≤ Pr(A). Similar reasoning
for expected distances when the distance functions are
bounded.
Definition 1. Let’s assume that (Ω,F , P, d) is a met-
ric probability space with a probability measure P on a
σ-algebra F = PΩ and a 1 bounded pseudometric d.
For a given subset U ⊂ Ω, the expected distance of U
is defined as
edP,d(U) =
∫
Ω
d(x,U)dP
=
∫
U
d(x,U)dP
where the distance between a point and a set is con-
ventionally defined as
d(x,U) = min
y∈U
d(x, y).
Since d(x, ∅) = 1 and d(x,Ω) = 0 we have
edP,d(∅) = 1 , edP,d(Ω) = 0 .
Even though an expected distance of a set U is defined
using P , when we perform an inference on edP,d(U) we
do not assume any knowledge of P . Therefore, we can
safely omit P from the notation in inference problems
under unknown probability distribution P . We will
also omit d if there is no confusion for a base metric.
Since we assumed that F = PΩ, d(x,U) is always a
measurable function.
We can also define expected distance functions with re-
spect to any kind of belief theoretic measures (Shafer
1976). The only difference is that the probability mea-
sure P is changed into one of belief theoretic functions.
A belief function Bel is a function that satisfies
• B1. Bel(A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ F .
• B2. Bel(Ω) = 1.
• B3. Bel(⋃ni=1Ai) ≥∑n
r=1 (−1)r+1
∑
{I′⊂{1,··· ,n}||I′|=r} Bel(
⋂
i∈I′ Ai).
A doubt function and a plausibility function are de-
fined from Bel.
Doubt(A) = Bel(Ac)
Pl(A) = 1−Bel(Ac).
But they can be also defined as set functions on Ω that
satisfy the following properties.
Doubt(∅) = 1, Doubt(Ω) = 0
Doubt(
n⋂
i=1
Ai)
≥
n∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{I⊂{1,2,··· ,n}||I|=r}
Doubt(
⋃
i∈I
Ai)
Plaus(∅) = 0, P laus(Ω) = 1
Plaus(
n⋂
i=1
Ai)
≤
n∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{I⊂{1,2,··· ,n}||I|=r}
Plaus(
⋃
i∈I
Ai)
3 Inclusion-exclusion principle
The inclusion-exclusion principle about set union and
intersection is one of the most important properties
in combinatorics, and has applications in diverse ar-
eas. Especially belief theoretic functions of Dempster-
Shafer theory are defined by modifying the equality
of the inclusion exclusion principle (Shafer 1976). We
will propose a theorem on minimum and maximum
that is similar to the inclusion-exclusion principle.
Theorem 1 (Alternating min-max). Let (G,≤, ∗)
be a commutative group with a linear order ≤ and a
group operation ∗. For d1, · · · , dn ∈ G we have
max(d1, · · · , dn) =
n∑
r=1
[ ∑
{I⊂{1,··· ,n}||I|=r}
min
i∈I
di
](−1)r+1
min(d1, · · · , dn) =
n∑
r=1
[ ∑
{I⊂{1,··· ,n}||I|=r}
max
i∈I
di
](−1)r+1
where −1 represents the inverse in the group and the
summation is for the group operation.
The proofs can be found in (Lee 2006). Let’s consider
a special case when G = R and ∗ = + to get the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let (Ω, d) be a metric space. For a finite
class {Ai}ni=1 of subsets of Ω we have
d(x,
n⋂
i=1
Ai) ≥
n∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{I⊂{1,··· ,n}||I|=r}
d(x,
⋃
i∈I
Ai)
Proof. From the definition of set distance, we have
d(x,
⋂
i∈I
Ai) ≥ max
i∈I
d(x,Ai),
d(x,
⋃
i∈I
Ai) = min
i∈I
d(x,Ai).
The theorem follows from theorem 1.
We have the following general fact of expectations for
any belief theoretic measures since finite sums can be
interchangeable with integrals.
Theorem 3. Let (Ω, P ), be a space with a belief the-
oretic measure P . If measurable functions f , fi, i ∈ I
satisfy an (in)equality
f 4
∑
i∈I
aifi
where 4 is an (in)equality and ai, i ∈ I are constants,
then
EP (f) 4
∑
i∈I
aiEP (fi).
We have the following property of the expected dis-
tance function as a special case of previous two theo-
rems.
Theorem 4. Let P be a belief theoretic function.
Given Ai ⊂ (Ω, P, d), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
edP,d(
n⋂
i=1
Ai)
≥
n∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{I⊂{1,2,··· ,n}||I|=r}
edP,d(
⋃
i∈I
Ai)
This theorem shows that expected distance functions
become doubt functions. An important property of be-
lief theoretic functions is the Mo¨bius inversion (Shafer
1976). A mass function m is defined to be a set func-
tion on Ω that satisfies
1. m(∅) = 0
2.
∑
U⊂Ωm(U) = 1.
It is known that the following inversion theorem holds
for any doubt function.
Theorem 5. If ed is an expected distance function,
there is a mass function m such that
ed(A) =
∑
U⊂Ac
m(U)
m(A) =
∑
U⊂A
(−1)|A|−|U |ed(U)
At this point we note that our inequalities are funda-
mentally different from those in Halpern and Pucella’s
paper (2002) that can be stated as
EBel(
n∨
i=1
Xi)
≥
n∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{I⊂{1,2,··· ,n}||I|=r}
EBel(
∧
i∈I
Xi)
where Xi’s are gambles (random variables). Our in-
equality is derived from the inequality of distance func-
tions. It does not change the direction regardless of
base measures. The above inequality came from the
belief theoretic measure upon which the expectation
is defined. Therefore, different inequalities hold for
different base measures. For example, the above in-
equality becomes an equality when the base measure
is a probability measure.
4 Dual measures of the expected
distance function
Since expected distance function is a doubt function,
we can also consider dual functions of an expected dis-
tance function.
Definition 2. The expected similarity, expected abso-
luteness, and expected relativeness are defined as
es(A) = 1− ed(A)
ea(A) = ed(Ac)
er(A) = 1− ed(AC)
Because ed(A) + ed(Ac) ≤ 1 we have
ed(A) ≤ er(A)
ea(A) ≤ es(A)
The equality holds when the distance function is crisp
(values are 0 or 1) or when the probability measure is
crisp. Let’s see ea in its integration form.
ea(A) =
∫
A
d(x,Ac)dP
This measures the expected distance between A and
Ac. The bigger ea is, the more A becomes an absolute
choice. Therefore the bigger er is, the less A becomes
an absolute choice. We can compare the meaning of
ed and er in the following example.
Example 1. Let’s assume that a search team for a
lost child needs to pick up one of two places A, B as a
starting point. If d(A,B) is small, it is not meaning-
ful to spend time to optimize the starting point since
the other point will be reached soon. This can be repre-
sented with expected distance and expected relativeness.
Let d(A,B) = 0.2, and the real probability of the lost
child being in A and B be P(A) = 0.1 and P(B) = 0.9.
Then,
ed({A}) = 0.2 · 0.9 = 0.18 .
Because the cost of wrong prediction is low, even a
relatively improbable place “A” has low expected dis-
tance. But the expected relativeness is big because the
alternative “B” also has low expected distance.
er({A}) = 1− ed({A}c)
= 1− 0.2 · 0.1 = 0.98 .
This represents that even though predicting “A” has
little risk, it need not be the best choice since predicting
{A}c = {B} also has little risk.
As in belief theory we can consider a tuple
[ed(A), er(A)]
to represent the uncertainty of a probabilistic event A
in metric space. The interval becomes smaller when
the distance function is crisp with respect to A,Ac. It
means that the set A becomes a more distinctive cate-
gory with respect to the distance. If the interval is very
small, an expected distance behaves like a probability
measure.
ed(A) + ed(Ac) ≈ 1 .
Since ed(A) ≤ P (Ac), actual values can be derived
from probabilities.
ed(A) ≈ P (Ac).
5 Inference on product of metric
spaces
When we deal with inference problems with a large
number of variables, it is almost impossible to main-
tain the data set without factoring the whole space into
product spaces. To reduce the dimension of product
spaces, statistical analysis often assumes that variables
are independent. Events A1, · · · , An are mutually in-
dependent relative to probability if and only if
Pr(
⋂
i∈I
Ai) =
∏
i∈I
Pr(Ai)
for any I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}. A set of σ-fields F1, · · · ,Fn are
said to be mutually independent when for any given
Ai ∈ Fi, A1, · · · , An are mutually independent. We
can extend this condition to expected distance func-
tions.
Definition 3. Events A1, · · · , An are mutually inde-
pendent relative to expected distance if and only if
1− ed(
⋂
i∈I
Ai) =
∏
i∈I
(1− ed(Ai))
for any I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}.
In probability theory, the product measure space and
the product probability are defined as
n∏
i=1
Fi = σ-field generated by
{
n∏
i=1
Ai|Ai ∈ Fi} ,
(P1 × P2)(E) =
∫
X
P2(Ex) dP1(x)
=
∫
Y
P1(Ey) dP2(y) .
where Ex = {y : (x, y) ∈ E} and Ey = {x : (x, y) ∈
E}. This product probability makes Ex, Ey indepen-
dent events. We will construct a product expected dis-
tance function so that it also preserves the mutual in-
dependence. For that purpose we need a special prod-
uct metric.
Definition 4. If {(Ωi, di)}1≤i≤n are 1 bounded metric
spaces, a metric Λn ~d on
∏n
i=1 Ωi is defined as
Λn~d(~x, ~y)
=
n∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∏
{I⊂{1,2,··· ,n}||I|=r},i∈I
di(xi, yi)
= 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− di(xi, yi))
where ~xn = (x1, · · · , xn).
Theorem 6. If {(Ωi, di)}1≤i≤n are 1 bounded met-
ric spaces, then (
∏n
i=1 Ωi, Λ
n ~d) becomes a 1 bounded
metric space.
Because of restricted space, refer to (Lee 2006) for
omitted proofs. Most of known metrics on prod-
uct spaces such as Euclidean metric, product metric,
supremum metric, etc. are not appropriate for reason-
ing. The Euclidean metric does not even become a 1-
bounded metric on a product space. Other metrics are
dependent on the order of spaces or not constructed
recursively. Λn ~d satisfies all such requirements. Fur-
thermore, it is a unique distance function that satisfies
following conditions.
Theorem 7. Λn ~d is unique under the following con-
ditions.
1. Λn+1(d1, · · · , dn, dn+1)
= Λ2(Λn(d1, · · · , dn), dn+1)
2. Λn(d1, · · · , 1, · · · , dn) = 1
3. Λn(0, · · · , 0) = 0
4. Λn(d1, · · · , di, · · · , dj , · · · dn)
= Λn(d1, · · · , dj , · · · , di, · · · , dn)
5. ∂Λ
n
∂di
(d1, · · · , dn) = f(d1, · · · , dˆi · · · , dn)
The following theorem shows that if more different as-
pects are known, the distance between two concepts
becomes bigger.
Theorem 8. Given (Ω, di), 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1,
Λn(d1, · · · dn) ≤ Λn+1(d1, · · · , dn, dn+1)
A partial order < on [0, 1]n can be defined as ~x < ~y if
and only if xi < yi for some i, and not xi > yi for any
0 ≤ i ≤ n. Λn ~d preserves this order in the following
sense.
Theorem 9. If ~x < ~y < ~z, then Λn ~d(~x, ~y) <
Λn~d(~x, ~z).
Metrics such as sup(d1, · · · , dn) does not preserve this
order. Now we will prove the mutual independence
under Λn ~d.
Lemma 10. For Ai ⊂ (Ωi, di) we have
1− Λn ~d(~x,
n∏
i=1
Ai) =
n∏
i=1
(1− di(xi, Ai)).
The following theorem for mutual independence fol-
lows from this lemma.
Theorem 11. Let Ai ⊂ (Ωi,Fi, Pi, di) for each
i. If F1, · · · ,Fn are mutually independent, then on
(
∏n
i=1 Ωi,
∏n
i=1 Fi, P,Λn ~d)
1− edP,Λn ~d(
∏
i∈I
Ai) =
∏
i∈I
(1− edPi,di(Ai))
Given Ai ⊂ Ωi, it is a common convention to denote
Ai ⊂
∏n
i=1 Ωi for Ω1×· · ·×Ωi−1×Ai×Ωi+1×· · ·×Ωn.
Lemma 12. If Ai, Bi ⊂ (Ωi, di) for i = 1, · · · , n then
Λn~d(A1 × · · · × Ωi × · · · ×An,
B1 × · · · ×Bi × · · · ×Bn)
= Λn−1~d(A1 × · · · × Aˆi × · · · ×An,
B1 × · · · × Bˆi × · · · ×Bn).
Because of this lemma, for Ai, Bi ⊂ (Ωi, di) we have
di(Ai, Bi) = Λn ~d(Ai, Bi).
Theorem 13. Let (Ωi,Fi, Pi, di) be the probability
space with metric. If Ai ⊂ Ωi then
edP,Λn ~d(Ω1 × · · · ×Ai × · · · × Ωn) = edPi,di(Ai) .
6 Axiomatizing expected distance
6.1 Syntax and semantics
The syntax of a logic of expected distance LED is de-
fined as follows.
Definition 5. Let Π = {P1, P2, · · · } be a set of prim-
itive propositions. The set of propositional formulas
is the closure of Π under the Boolean operations ∧,¬
as in the propositional logic. An expected distance
term is an expression of the form a1ED(ϕ1) + · · · +
anED(ϕn), where ϕi is a propositional formula and
ai’s are real numbers. A basic expected distance for-
mula is a statement of the form t ≥ α where t is a
expected distance term and α is a real number. An ex-
pected distance formula or just a formula of the lan-
guage LE is a Boolean combination of basic expected
distance formulas.
As an example, (2ED(P ∧Q) + 0.23ED(¬Q) ≥ 0.2) ∨
(ED(¬P ) < 0.1) is a formula. We will use abbrevia-
tions such as t < α for ¬(t ≥ α), t ≤ α for (−1)t ≥ −α,
t = α for (t ≤ α) ∧ (t ≥ α).
The semantics of LED is defined on a probability
structure with a metric, which is a tuple M =
(Ω,F , P, d, pi). (Ω,F , P ) is a probability space where
all subsets of Ω are measurable. pi : Π → {0, 1} is a
truth assignment function of atomic propositions. d is
a metric on Ω. We first define the interpretation of a
propositional formula φ.
ϕM = {ω ∈ Ω|pi(ω)(ϕ) = 1}.
For a given model M ,
M |= a1ED(ϕ1) + · · ·+ anED(ϕn) ≥ α
iff a1ed(ϕM1 ) + · · ·+ aned(ϕMn ) ≥ α
We extend |= to arbitrary formulas as
M |= f1 ∧ f2 iff M |= f1 and M |= f2
M |= ¬f iff M 6|= f
Note that even though we defined a semantics for prob-
ability structures, since an expected distance can be
taken with respect to any other belief theoretic mea-
sures, we can make logics for those structures just by
changing the probability structure into those.
6.2 Axioms of LED
Now we will construct a sound and complete axioms
for our logic. First, we use the axioms AxioL that is
defined in (Fagin, Halpern, & Megiddo 1990), (Fagin &
Halpern 1994), and shown to be sound and complete.
I. AxiomP : Axioms for propositional logic.
II. AxiomL : Axioms for linear inequalities including
AxiomP .
The following axioms characterize the logic of expected
distances.
III. AxiomED: Axioms for expected distance including
AxiomL.
1. (true) ED(true) = 0.
2. (false) ED(false) = 1.
3. (nonnegative) ED(ϕ) ≥ 0.
4. (inclusion-exclusion) ED(
∧n
i=1 ϕi)
≥∑nr=1(−1)r+1∑{I⊂{1,2,··· ,n}||I|=r}ED(∨i∈I ϕi).
5. (substitution) ϕ ⇔ ψ in propositional logic, then
ED(ϕ) = ED(ψ).
The inclusion exclusion axiom is the generalization of
the simple case
ED(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≥ ED(ϕ) + ED(ψ)− ED(ϕ ∨ ψ) .
Even though these axioms are for probability mea-
sures, the axioms for other belief theoretic measures
would be the same. We can prove the following prop-
erties of expected distance from AxiomED.
Theorem 14. 1. ED(¬ϕ) ≤ 1− ED(ϕ).
2. ED(ϕ) ≥ ED(ϕ ∧ ψ) + ED(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)− 1.
3. If ϕ⇒ ψ then ED(ϕ) ≤ ED(ψ).
6.3 Soundness and Completeness
Now we will prove the soundness and completeness
theorems for the logic of expected distance. Even
though an expected distance function is a doubt func-
tion, the axioms for doubt function need not be com-
plete for the system of expected distance. For example,
a probability measure is a plausibility measure, but the
axiom set of plausibility measure is not complete for
probabilistic systems.
Theorem 15. AxiomED is sound and weakly com-
plete.
Proof. As for soundness, all axioms except for
inclusion-exclusion axiom can be easily proved to be
sound. The inclusion-exclusion axiom comes from the-
orem 4.
To prove the weak completeness we will build a model
for any given consistent formula f ∈ LED. Once we
have the model existence, the completeness is proved
as following. Let’s assume that Γ |= ϕ for a finite
Γ. If Γ 6` φ then ∧Γ ∨ ¬φ is consistent. By model
existence we have a model M such that M |= ∧Γ ∨
¬ϕ. Therefore Γ 6|= ϕ. This contradiction solves the
completeness.
Let’s represent f in a disjunctive normal form g1∨· · ·∨
gn where each gi is a conjunction of basic expected dis-
tance formulas and their negations. If f is consistent,
then some gi is consistent. Moreover, any model that
satisfies gi also satisfies f . Therefore we only need to
make a model for the formula gi.
Let {P1, · · · , Pk} be the set of all primitive proposi-
tions that appears in gi. Let {ϕ1, · · · , ϕ2k} be the set
of all possible formulas where ϕi = ±P1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±Pk.
(±Pj represents Pj or ¬Pj). Let n = 2k. For any
propositional formula ψ that appear in gi, we have a
set I ⊂ {1, · · · , n} such that
|= ψ ⇔
∨
i∈I
ϕi .
Let g′i be the formula made from gi by substituting all
occurrences of propositional formula ψ with equivalent∨
i∈I ϕi’s. Because of the soundness of the axioms, it
is enough to construct a model for the formula g′i.
Now consider the formula h that is the conjunction
of g′i with the following formulas that represents the
axioms. The idea is to add enough restrictions so that
any solution of the linear equation satisfy conditions
of expected distance.
We first conjunct a formula for true. Since true ≡∨n
i=1 ϕi,
ED(
n∨
i=1
ϕi) = 0 .
Second, we conjunct a formula for the empty set. Since
false ≡ ∨∅ ϕi,
ED(
∨
∅
ϕi) = 1 .
Third, we conjunct 2n formulas that represent the non-
negative conditions for all I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}.
ED(
∨
i∈I
ϕi) ≥ 0 .
Finally, we conjunct formulas that represent the
inclusion-exclusion conditions. For all K ⊂
P{0, · · · , n},
ED([
∨
i∈⋂K ϕi])
≥
|K|∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{K′⊂K||K′|=r}
ED(
∨
i∈⋃K′ ϕi) .
Since g′i is consistent in AxiomED, h is also consis-
tent in AxiomED. Therefore it should be consistent
in AxiomL. In AxiomL, the expected distance terms
ED(
∨
i∈I ϕi)’s are considered as variables. Since we
know the completeness of the AxiomL, h should have
a model. A formula in the logic of linear inequalities
is a system of linear inequalities. A model of a for-
mula has an interpretation map that assigns a solution
for the linear inequality system of the given formula.
Therefore, the model of h assigns a number eI for each
variable ED(
∨
i∈I ϕi)}. So that if the eI ’s are substi-
tuted into the variables, the linear inequality system
is satisfied. So we have
e∅ = 1,
e{1,··· ,n} = 0,
eI ≥ 0,
e⋂K ≥
|K|∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{K′⊂K||K′|=r}
e⋃K′ .
From Lemma 16 there is a model M = (Ω,F , P, d, pi)
such that
edP,d([
∨
i∈I
ϕi]M ) = edP,d(
⋃
i∈I
ϕMi ) = eI .
Therefore, M |= h and the theorem is proved.
Lemma 16. For {eI ∈ R|I ⊂ {1, · · · , n}} such that
e∅ = 1,
e{1,··· ,n} = 0,
eI ≥ 0,
e⋂K ≥
|K|∑
r=1
(−1)r+1
∑
{K′⊂K||K′|=r}
e⋃K′ .
where K ⊂ P{1, · · · , n}, we have a probability metric
space M = (Ω,F , P, d, pi) such that
edP,d([
∨
i∈I
ϕi]M ) = edP,d(
⋃
i∈I
ϕMi ) = eI .
Proof. An underlying space Ω and a propositional in-
terpretation pi is constructed as follows.
Ω =
⋃
i
ϕMi
ϕMi = pi(ϕi) = Xi ∪ Yi
Xi = {xi,J}J⊂{1,···ˆi··· ,n}
Yi =
⋃
j 6=i
{yi,j,K}K⊂{1,··· ,jˆ,··· ,n}.
Before constructing a probability measure P , let’s
consider a discrete space of n-points, Ω′ =
{aϕM1 , · · · , aϕMn }. A set function ed′ : PΩ′ → R is
defined as ed′(
⋃
i∈I{aϕMi }) = eI . Because of the prop-
erties of eI , ee′ satisfies all properties of doubt func-
tion. Therefore we can apply Mo¨bius transformation
to get the mass function m : PΩ′ → R. If we repre-
sentm(
⋃
i∈I ϕ
M
i ) = mI , we have the following equality
from the definition of Mo¨bius transformation.
mI =
∑
J⊂I
(−1)|I|−|J|eJ .
eI =
∑
J⊂Ic
mJ .
Consider the measurable space F = PΩ. Since Ω is
finite, a probability distribution on F is determined
by the probability at each point of Ω. So, we can
construct the probability distribution P on F as
P (xi,J ) =
mJc
|Jc| , P (yi,J,K) = 0 .
Now we will define a pseudo distance function d on Ω
as
d(xj′,K′ , yi,j,K)
=
{
0 if j = j′ and K = K ′ and i 6∈ K
1 else
d(yi,j,K , yi′,j′,K′)
= max(d(xj,K , yi,j,K), d(xj′,K′ , yi′,j′,K′))
d(xi,J , xi′,J ′) = 1
Let’s show the triangular inequality. Since all values
are 0 or 1, the only cases that we are concerned is
the case of 0 + 0 ≥ 1. Since 0 distance can not hap-
pen between xi,J ’s, the remaining cases are as follows.
First,
d(xj,K , yi,j,K) + d(xj,K , yi′,j,K) ≥ d(yi,j,K , yi′,j,K) ,
d(xj,K , yi,j,K) + d(yi,j,K , yi′,j,K) ≥ d(xj,K , yi′,j,K)
follows from the definition of d. Finally,
d(yi,j,K , yi′,j′,K′) + d(yi′,j′,K′ , yi′′,j′′,K′′)
≥ d(yi,j,K , yi′′,j′′,K′′)
holds since
max(d(xj,K , yi,j,K), d(xj′,K′ , yi′,j′,K′))
+max(d(xj′,K′ , yi′,j′,K′), d(xj′′,K′′ , yi′′,j′′,K′′))
≥ max(d(xj,K , yi,j,K), d(xj′′,K′′ , yi′′,j′′,K′′)) .
This proves that d is a pseudo distance function.
Since we constructed M , we will check that the ex-
pected distance edP,d satisfies edP,d(
⋃
i∈I ϕ
M
i ) = eI .
The distance between xj,K and
⋃
i∈I ϕ
M
i is as follows.
d(xj,K ,
⋃
i∈I
ϕMi ) = min
i∈I
min
j′,K′
d(xj,K , yi,j′,K′)
=
{
1 if I ⊂ K
0 else .
where j 6∈ K by definition. Therefore,
ed(
⋃
i∈I
ϕMi )
=
∑
ω∈Ω
d(ω,
⋃
i∈I
ϕMi ) · P (ω)
=
∑
j∈Kc
[ ∑
K⊂{1,··· ,n}
d(xj,K ,
⋃
i∈I
ϕMi ) · P (xj,K)
]
=
∑
j∈Kc
[ ∑
K⊂{1,··· ,n},I⊂K
P (xj,K)
]
=
∑
K⊂{1,··· ,n},I⊂K
[ ∑
j∈Kc
mKc
|Kc|
]
=
∑
K⊂{1,··· ,n},I⊂K
mKc
=
∑
Kc⊂Ic
mKc =
∑
J⊂Ic
mJ = eI .
7 Discussion
We constructed reasoning systems on metric spaces us-
ing expected distance functions. These systems could
be built on a metric space equipped with any kind of
belief theoretic measures. The axioms we adopted for
these systems were sound and complete. But symbols
like “Pr” or “D” that represent probability or distance
are not included in LED. We showed that probability
logic and the logic of expected distance are not more
expressive than each other (Lee 2006). Furthermore,
extended languages including some of those symbols
are strictly more expressive than LED. It is an inter-
esting question whether there exist sets of complete
axioms for those extended systems.
Reasoning with expected distance has many poten-
tial applications. One interesting application is a rea-
soning system for second order uncertainties (Gaif-
man 1986). Since uncertainty degrees are usually
represented in metric spaces, we can adopt expected
distance functions to represent second order uncer-
tainties. As an example, an expression such as
ED(“Prob(ϕ) = 0.5”) = 0.1 is an efficient represen-
tations when we represent a probability distribution
over probabilities of ϕ. Since Prob(“Prob(ϕ) = 0.5”)
would always become zero, a purely probabilistic sec-
ond order reasoning system should chose an interval
such as Prob(Prob(ϕ) ∈ [0.4, 0.6]) = 0.8. The rea-
soning for this choice is not clear, and tends to lose
more information in the process. There is no explicit
reason why we should choose the previous expression
instead of Prob(Prob(ϕ) ∈ [0.2, 0.9]) = 0.9. The rep-
resentation with expected distance is more natural and
intuitive.
Acknowledgement I thank Lawrence Moss for his
support and guidance for this paper.
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